China’s military incursion against Taiwan is a move to familiarize themselves with how a Taiwan conflict would look like

After China sent dozens of military aircrafts into Taiwan’s southwestern Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the weekend, former Pentagon official Drew Thompson said the move is consistent with patterns that have been established over the last five years and it is less clear whether the operation is a warning signal to the Biden administration.

Question: The Chinese military sent dozens of military aircrafts into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone over the weekend. The move came just days after the inauguration of the Biden administration. How do you assess the timing of the latest operation? Is Beijing trying to send a warning to the new administration in Washington?

Drew Thompson: I think it’s very difficult to know what the operational considerations are for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Often, planning cycles can be linked to things like personnel shifts, maintenance, and other factors. It’s not just pure political signaling. The PLA’s air and maritime operations in and around Taiwan have increased steadily since 2016.

The timing of the one this weekend is still consistent with patterns that have been established over the last five years. However, the PLA is inherently political and it’s very attuned to the politics of the communist party and international politics. I think this mission serves probably multiple purposes.

First, it’s a training mission to familiarize the PLA with what a Taiwan conflict would look like. It’s also possibly designed to test Taiwan’s air defense reactions. That’s probably first and foremost in the minds of the PLA. It’s less clear to me whether this is a signal to the Biden administration, but again we can’t escape the timing.

This is really an opportunity for the Biden administration to formulate how they will respond to Beijing’s threats and intimidation through this type of military missions around Taiwan.

DW: The U.S. State Department issued a very timely response on Saturday following the first incursion, in which they urged Beijing to cease intimidation campaigns against Taiwan and return to peaceful dialogue with Taiwan. How do you assess the response from Washington?

Drew Thompson: I am impressed by the statement that the Biden administration made. The first point is that the statement came out very quickly, which indicates that there isn’t a great deal of deliberation. We know from past administrations that decisions were often slow in coming.

This was a very rapid response and I think that’s an important indicator that their head is in a very particular place on issues related to China and it’s very clear where it is. The other thing that struck me was how carefully worded it was and how firm an assurance the statement was to Taiwan and all U.S. allies and partners.

I think we have also seen a very clear statement about how this administration is going to frame its One China Policy. That’s not something you can tinker with as you go in your administration. You basically lock it in at the beginning of your administration so everyone can observe it.

You can’t easily tweak your One China policy in the midst of your administration. What struck me is that they frame their One China Policy on the three communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances. There was no caveat about the Six Assurances. In the past, we often heard the One China Policy is based on the three joint communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act while the Six Assurances were rarely mentioned.

The fact that the Six Assurances were mentioned is really important in terms of how the Six Assurances are both prescriptive and proscriptive. It really informs decisions that will be made for the next four years that will affect regional stability. The Six Assurances are still very relevant to high level political decision-making.

The fact that they have placed it so prominently indicates that the Six Assurances is not only a good practice, but it’s now a policy. That’s a big upgrade of U.S. security commitment to Taiwan in a very formal way. It’s a very rhetorical strengthening of U.S. commitment to Taiwan. This is pretty tremendous.

DW: On the same day that the first wave of Chinese military aircraft incursion happened, the U.S. sent an aircraft carrier group into the South China Sea. While they highlighted the move is to ensure the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, how much do you think the move is a response to the Chinese military incursion?

Drew Thompson: I think the presence of a U.S. aircraft carrier group in the South China Sea is a regular occurrence and it underscores how vitally important the South China Sea is as a sea way. Again, the purpose of an aircraft carrier group is not to antagonize China. The purpose of the aircraft carrier group is to go from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean.

I don’t think there is a connection between the aircraft carrier group going from one part of the world to another and the PLA missions. I think you will find at any given time that the U.S. is moving forces between the Pacific Ocean and back again. At the same time, you have the PLA air force doing its training and exercising on a recurring basis. I wouldn’t conflate the two.

It does underscore two critical interests for both Beijing and Washington. Washington’s interest is that freedom of navigation to transit from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. Beijing is signaling its interest in Taiwan through these shows of force and military intimidation.

DW: Some experts have pointed out that repeated military incursion launched by China will increase the pressure on Taiwan’s air defense. Last year, Taiwan launched its aircraft more than 300 times as a response to Chinese military aircraft incursion. From your perspective, do you think Taiwan’s air defense will come under more pressure and become more vulnerable if they continue to respond at the current frequency?

Drew Thompson: PLA has every right to operate its aircraft in international airspace. The pressure that Taiwan feels is political and in some cases, it is self-imposed. Taiwan is not obligated to send military aircrafts to intercept every Chinese aircraft that enters its ADIZ. The commitment to maintain an ADIZ is identifying aircrafts that can be accomplished by other censors, like radars.

If you can identify a PLA strike package by radar, then you don’t need to necessarily send an aircraft out, especially if that’s going to create operational pressure on your air force. That’s a question of whether Taiwan’s defense budget needs to increase or not. If they did so, it may not feel the financial pressure while it can afford to maintain an aircraft that can do these intercepts.

Again, it’s a question of what Taiwan’s doctrine is for handling such operations. If they feel the need to have actual visual identification and they want that with an armed aircraft in case those planes don’t turn away, then you want to have armed aircraft in the sky that can challenge them.

At the same time, you have surface-to-air missiles that are a persistent presence which can defend Taiwan’s air space as well. It’s really a self-imposed cost that Taiwan bears in this self-defined need to intercept these aircrafts that enter its ADIZ. That’s up to Taiwan, but I think this is more of a political issue than a military operational one.

One can conversely argue that if Taiwan were to simply not recognize that these missions put pressure on it, they essentially defeat the PLA’s objective. You could say alternatively that the freedom of navigation is a right and that Taiwan also upholds international law. They don’t feel pressured and feel confident. They invest heavily in air defense system that can identify aircrafts operating in international air space and they don’t feel like it’s some kind of insult.

If they refuse to feel insulted, you essentially put the cost back on China to fly its aircrafts and amortize them. If Taiwan wants to signal the alternative, it is already doing so. It is investing in a whole range of ground-based long range strike weapons as well as air-launched strike weapons that can strike the Chinese mainland.

Does that impose pressure on China in the same way? Probably not but it certainly affects the balance. This is the reality that Taiwan has to face and it needs to adequately fund its military so it doesn’t create pressure. It should become part of the operational norm.

This interview first appeared in Mandarin on DW’s Chinese website.