How to draw the LAC is at the heart of the latest Sino-Indian border confrontation

William Yang
4 min readJun 18, 2020

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Several military confrontations have taken place between India and China in the border region close to the Line of Actual Control. On Monday night, Beijing and New Delhi set off the deadliest military confrontation between them over the last 45 years, causing dozens of soldiers to lose their lives. Derek Grossman from Rand Corporation thinks that even though the current situation is concerning along the Sino-Indian border, he thinks both countries can find ways to prevent the military confrontation from further escalating.

Question: More than two weeks after the most recent clash between Chinese and Indian soldiers, we witnessed the deadliest physical confrontation between the military from both sides on Tuesday, resulting in dozens of casualties. Why do you think the tension persists for a much longer period of time this time around when comparing to previous confrontations? Is there a root cause that China and India can’t really settle?

Grossman: There are many hypotheses regarding the cause of the current conflict, but it is difficult to discern which is most valid. For example, one theory is that India’s unilateral annexation of Jammu & Kashmir in August 2019 made China fundamentally reconsider its positioning along the LAC because Chinese claims in Ladakh were undermined by India’s move.

Another is that Indian and Chinese patrols have become more aggressive and overlapping in their routes, which opened the possibility for miscalculation. Yet another is that Indian infrastructure construction on their side of the LAC provoked a Chinese response.

But China is building up its infrastructure too. Macro-level issues may also be at play. For example, China has seemed to want to demonstrate strength during the coronavirus pandemic, not only challenging India in the Himalayas, but Taiwan and counterclaimants in the South China Sea.

This is a long-winded way of saying its simply unclear, but my general sense is that it is not the latter because Chinese assertiveness dates back pre-pandemic. It is more likely related to local LAC issues such as enhanced patrolling and infrastructure development. The Doklam crisis in 2017 that lasted for months was the direct result of road construction.

Question: India and Beijing have both been pointing at each other for being the instigator in the latest round of clash, making it seem hard for Beijing and New Delhi to find a common ground for returning to peace. Is it because of the geographic importance of LAC and the disputed region? Or does it have more to do with each leader’s need to “save their own face” in front of citizens?

Grossman: I think there is a significant component of saving face, yes. These are two Asian giants that are quite prideful, and their respective news services have been in overdrive during this conflict to intimidate the other side into submission.

That said, the crux of the problem probably isn’t optics, but rather a fundamental disagreement about the history behind the establishment of the LAC. After all, China has normalized its land borders with all other surrounding nations, so it should not inherently be averse to doing the same with India.

But it clearly has a conception of where the LAC should be — though it won’t share maps with India, exacerbating the problem — and India does as well. This seems like a genuine border dispute at its core.

Question: Foreign ministers from China and India had a phone conversation on Wednesday to try to seek common ground on the conflict, and despite the consensus that both sides want to deescalate the tension, there doesn’t seem to be any concrete steps being agreed upon. What are some of the compromises that both sides need to make in order to achieve concrete deescalation at this point?

Grossman: The priority is to deescalate and find a permanent solution later. A permanent solution would require China to exchange maps of the LAC with India, and for the two sides to use these as a basis for final boundary delimitation.

But that probably isn’t in the cards anytime soon. In the meantime, it sounds like what happened in the latest bout of violence on Monday is that Indian troops burned Chinese tents they claim were not being dismantled in disputed areas, provoking a forceful Chinese response.

Both sides need to make good on their recent pledges to deescalate, and not try to attack while vacating disputed areas because such actions will simply re-escalate the conflict.

Question: While negotiation is continuing, India is asking its soldiers to remain on high alert along the border. Judging from the current climate and mood between both countries, how do you think we can foresee the situation to develop?

Grossman: Although the violence and heated rhetoric has been alarming, I’m still quite optimistic that China and India will find a way to defuse tensions. Neither wants a full-fledged war at this time. For China, doing so would only detract attention away from its priority region in the Pacific and push India closer to the US, Australia, and Japan — further isolating China.

For India, China is its number one trading partner and military defeat is quite likely without external intervention that is unlikely to be forthcoming. Not to mention that both countries are nuclear powers, and while it is extremely unlikely that a conflict in the Himalayas would ever escalate to that point, it unfortunately cannot entirely be ruled out either.

This interview is first published in Mandarin on DW’s Chinese website.

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William Yang
William Yang

Written by William Yang

William Yang is a journalist based in Taiwan, where he writes about politics, society, and human rights issues in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.

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